#### NARRATIVE

#### Now we will play Real Terrorism by Greenie

VERSE 1

Dear Uncle Sam, I hope they bump this jam...

It ain't jus' about Iraq—or 'dat shit in Iran...

'Dem civilians you (done) killed in Afghanistan...

Who wuzn't even part of no Taliban...

Who wuz u rapin back in Viet NAM?

Who wuz u killin out in Pakistan... ?

Whachu done did to 'dem Afri-CAHNS... ?

Or the genocide you did to 'dem Indi-AHNS... ?

If terrorists just look to kill civil-YAHNS...

Then why you done killed over a MILL-YAHN...

Hey-- KRS-One, maaahn—c'mon back me?

I mean—if you wuz an Iraqi, would you really be happy? (NOPE! )

With foreigners invading—killin, shootin, and blastin...

Thousandz of civilians—yo—here's ALL I'm askin...

CHORUS

Which one, Which One—Which is the REAL Terrorism?

'Da Indian Genocide or a Taliban Prison?

Which one, Which One— Which is the REAL Terrorism?

Iraqis who fight back or Bush's invasion?

Which one, Which One—I say they ALL Terrorism!

Hijackin 200 ------AND the enslavement of millions!

VERSE 2

You created terrorism and MADE chemical warfare...

When there's desutrction on Earth—I just look and, Sam---... you're there!

The propaganda u dropped, the whole worl' forgot

U gave Indians blankets w/ smallpox...

Tell EM WHAT u did Sam, tell em what you done...

At Bikini Atoll –you wiped out EVERYONE...

Castle Bravo – was a bomb with an explosive force...

Of a 1, 000 hiroshimas... and you set it off...

... near a peaceful (little) sundrenched tropical island...

... erasing and displacing every man, woman and child...

Who rejected that protocol for biological weapons... ?

Who refused to sign that treaty banning nuclear testing...

Who's got ten thousand nukes, ready to be blasted?

They don't have a handful, so all that I asked is...

#### Ask yourself where the real terrorism is happening, the 1AC’s proposed invasion of Venezuela leaves them with no more resources for themselves. Oil development is part of the Eurocentric logic that ignores indigenous pleas to leave them alone and exploits the entirety of Latin America

Stetson, Boise State Assistant Professor, 11

(George, PhD, Assistant Professor, Boise State University, 2011, Ethnicity from Various Angles and Through Varied Lenses: Yesterday's Today in Latin America, “Indigenous Resistance to Oil Development”, Google Books, Page 225, Accessed 7/10/13, NC)

There is still much work to do in terms of understanding the positions of indigenous peoples. Part of the difficulty is related to the level of diversity within the indigenous movement. Furthermore, indigenous peoples are often weary of (and take offense to) attempts to speak for all indigenous peoples. However, some of the difficulty also lies in the degree of sophistication in many of indigenous responses, arguments, and positions. This sophistication- combined with the state's Eurocentric mindset -has made it increasingly difficult for state to take indigenous claims seriously.

FINAL COMMENTS: EUROCENTRIC MODERNITY AND THE ERASURE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS

My argument is that the Peruvian state finds it difficult to understand indigenous political positions because they are stuck in a Eurocentric conception of modernity, which owes its existence to Europe, not to the realities, experiences, and histories of the indigenous peoples of Latin America. Eurocentric modernity is based on universal values, a teleological notion of development - the apex being Europe and the United States - and a modern-capitalist ( and socialist) framework that values land and natural resources as exploitable material for the benefit of the modern nation. Following this logic, it is difficult for the state to understand how anyone could oppose oil development, especially "poor" people from the Amazon, which is perhaps why Garda repeatedly argues that indigenous ideological backwardness is one of the main obstacles to Peruvian development and also why the president of Perupetro finds it difficult to understand why "poor" indigenous peoples might oppose oil development.

#### Trade and finance are the method of choice for dominating the Global South and cementing coloniality—breeds racism and violence and has no place in the decolonial ethics of our alt

Kanth, 5

(Rajani Kannepalli, Against Eurocentrism: A Transcendent Critique of Modernist Science, Society, and Morals 67-69)

**The firearm, the printing press**, paper, **and the compass were to become the prime tools of Western domination of non-Western cultures; today, in the** golden **era of neoliberalist finance, one might add only** commerce and credit—that is, **trade and financial dependency**—**as the other set of allied mechanisms**. The simple, if ironic, fact that all of these were originally non-European inventions must be a sobering thought to those prone to genuflect before the putative superiority, and originality, of modernist science. It might also be noted that the (putative) absence of a compass did not inhibit navigation on the part of several non-European peoples who engaged in explorations not of necessity confluent with the motives of trade and conquest**. It was not a** state of mind, nor a **penchant for reflection, that furthered the rapid development of European natural science** (although the entire effort was located within the metaphysical matrix of anthropocentrism) **but rather dire industrial necessity in the context of desperate international, and internecine, rivalry and war, features that have but little changed in the modern period where most research that is amply funded is still of the strategic kind.** If one but adds commercial greed, to industrial need, then we effectively sum up the driving ethos—the colossal strengths and weakness—of European science. Salutary to note, in this regard, that neither Vedic wisdom, wherein science and ethics were combined, nor Buddhist or Jain explorations in mathematics, were either provoked by, or were concomitants of, conquest and accumulation but bore a purity of ardor and endeavor that has simply no modernist European equivalent leastways in the classical period of the Enlightenment (this does not mean that the later post-Vedic tradition did not inculcate philosophy as statecraft.. Kautilya's Arthashastra, in that regard, compares favorably with, if long prior to, Machiavelli's ideas). However, the new scientific outlook of the Enlightenment was not engendered unopposed and had to fight it way over the back of older traditions of science that were far more hospitable to humbler social needs and necessities, that is, they were not driven solely by greed or power. Much as the ideas of liberalism triumphed over church ideology by virtue not of better argument or better evidence, contrary to modernist legend, but the power of better organized force (as instanced in the politics of Galileo in success, and the lost crusade of the great Paracelsus, in failure), the new sciences simply expelled the old arts and pushed them to the outer margins of existence. **Superior force, organization, and iron discipline were the redoubtable tools of European mastery, but even they, in themselves, may not have sufficed to effect the supreme dominance that is visible today in all corners of the world** (excepting China, which remains the least Europeanized of any modernist social formation) **were this force not to be supplemented with a philosophy of domination that**, **to this day, has no pareil in the history of human endeavors. Non-European empires**, faced with the European peril, **had to learn the hard way that guns without arguments almost fail to fire altogether. Somewhere in the Renaissance, Europe possessed itself of such an inexorable ideology, a veritable manifest, of conquest of all things—and peoples**. **The very spirit of the ruling European (and his North-American counterparts) today is informed with this wantonly conquistadorean, carpetbagging, temper, still seeking gullible subjects cum consumers, wherever possible, still seeking to** take without giving, to rule without consent, ready to cheat on treaties, renege on friends, and **exact from the weak and the helpless**. **The craven U.S. invasion of Grenada**, infamous act of state piracy apart, **where the mightiest force on earth trampled on the poorest little island imaginable, and then awarded themselves a glittering gallery of medals**—more than one medal each for every soldier, sailor, and marine landed (and many who never landed incidentally)—**can convey but a very small appreciation of just how far from even the very simplest norms of morality European "civilization" has traversed in but a few centuries (equally linear and unbroken is the red line of infamy that connects the atrocities of the Europeans in Africa and the technology driven savagery of Americans in Vietnam)**. Indeed, **the very word itself today has no readily agreed upon meaning or significance in modernist society—just as similarly, economics, the ruling logos of modernism, has no place for**, and comprehension of, **the idea of fairness or justice, terms which are literally meaningless within that discourse. With the destruction of normative ties, the social basis of morality erodes and becomes privatized** (small wonder that the U.S. Supreme Court deems, with much relief, morality a local, community resource subject to local adjudications and alterations of fashioris). **Morality**, **like ethics, becomes merely an option, among many choices, for the ordinary person, to be exercised when it involves the least cost to the practitioner**; like faith, its close country cousin, it has become effectively dispensable, and quite sub-optimal, as a workable code for conduct. Once again, the United States (where bad guys win with a grim, degrading, monotony), the most degenerately advanced in these directions, is living testimony to the simple rectitude of these propositions, whose truth is confirmable by simple, direct observation alone.

#### Their modernist politics privilege the West and underwrite violence and genocide in the name of civilization, rationality, science, and philosophy—the West is cast as the hero of the world, justifying the redemptive sacrifice of all others

Mignolo, Duke University Professor of Literature and Romance Studies, 2k

(Walter, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University Local Histories/Global Designs, p. 115-117)

enrique Dussel, an Argentinian philosopher associated with the philosophy of liberation, has been articulating a strong countermodern argument. I quote from the beginning of his Frankfurt lectures: **Modernity is**, for many (for Jurgen Habermas or Charles Taylor, for example), **in essentially or exclusively European phenomenon**. In these lectures, I will argue that **modernity is,** in fact, **a European phenomenon**, but one **constituted in dialectical relation with a non-European alterity that is its ultimate content**. **Modernity appears when Europe Affirms itself as the "center" of a World history that it inaugurates; the "periphery" that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition**. **The occlusion of this periphery** (and of the role of Spain and Portugal in the formation of the modern world system from the late fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries) **leads the major contemporary thinkers of the "center" into a Eurocentric fallacy in their understanding of modernity**. If their understanding of the genealogy of modernity is thus partial and provincial, their attempts at a critique or defense of it are likewise unilateral and, in part, false. (Dussel (19931 1995, 65) **The construction of the idea of modernity linked to European expansion**, as forged by European intellectuals, **was powerful enough to last almost five hundred years. Postcolonial discourses and theories began effectively to question that hegemony, a challenge that was unthinkable** (and perhaps unexpected) **by those who constructed and presupposed the idea of modernity as a historical period and implicitly as** *the* **locus of enunciation**—a locus of enunciation that **in the name of rationality, science, and philosophy as serted its own privilege over other forms of rationality or over what**, from the perspective of modern reason, **was nonrational**. I would submit, conse quently, that postcolonial literature and postcolonial theories are constructing a new concept of reason as differential loci of enunciation. What does "differential" mean? Differential here first means a displacement of the concept and practice of the notions of knowledge, science, theory, and understanding articulated during the modern period.® Thus, Dussel's region alization of modernity could be compared with Homi Bhabha's, both speak ing *from* different colonial legacies (Spanish and English respectively): "Driven by the subaltern history of the margins of modernity—rather than by the failures of logocentrism—I have tried, in some small measure, In *revise the known, to rename the postmodern from the position of the postcolo nial"* (Bhabha 1994, 175; emphasis added). I find a noteworthy coincidence between Dussel and Bhabha, albeit with some significant differences in accent. The coincidence lies in the very iui portant fact that the task of postcolonial reasoning (i.e., theorizing) is not only linked to the immediate political needs of decolonization (in Asia, Al rica, and the Caribbean) but also to the rereading of the paradigm of modi i n reason. This task is performed by Dussel and Bhabha in different, although complementary ways. After a detailed analysis of Kant's and Hegel's construction of the idea of I nlightenment in European history, Dussel summarizes the elements that i onstitute the myth of modernity: (1) **Modern (European) civilization understands itself as the most developed, the superior, civilization**; (2) **This sense of superiority obliges it**, **in the form of a categorical imperative**, **as it were, to "develop" (civilize**, uplift, educate) **the more primitive, barbarous, underdeveloped civilizations;** (3) The path of such development should be that followed by Europe in its own development out of antiquity and the Middle Ages; (4) Where **the barbarians or the primitive opposes the civilizing process, the praxis of modernity must**, in the last instance, **have recourse to the violence necessary to remove the obstacles to modernization**; (5) **This violence, which produces in many different ways, victims, takes on an almost ritualistic character: the civilizing hero invests his victims (the colonized, the slave, the woman, the ecological destruction of the earth,** etc.) **with the character of being participants in a process of redemptive sacrifice**; (6) **from the point of view of modernity, the barbarian or primitive is in a state of guilt** (for, among other things, opposing the civilizing process). **This allows modernity to present itself not only as innocent but also as a force that will emancipate or redeem its victims from their guilt**; (7) **Given this "civilizing" and redemptive character of modernity, the suffering and sacrifices (the costs) of modernization imposed on "immature" peoples, slaves, races, the "weaker" sex, el cetera, are inevitable and necessary**. (Dussel 119931 1995, 75) the myth of modernity is laid out by Dussel to confront alternative interpietations. While Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as postmodernist think• is such as Lyotard, Rorty, or Vattimo, all propose a critique of reason (a v iolent, coercive, and genocidal reason), Dussel proposes a critique of the enlightenment's irrational moments as sacrificial myth not by negating reason but by asserting the reason of the other—thai is, by identifying postcolonial reason as differential locus of enunciation. The intersection between tbi idea of a self-centered modernity grounded in its own appropriation of greco-Roman (classical) legacies and an emerging idea of modernity from the margins (or countermodernity) makes clear that history does not begin in Greece, and that different historical beginnings are, at the same time, anchored to diverse loci of enunciation. This simple axiom is, 1 submit, a bind.internal one for and of postsubaltern reason. Finally, Bhabha's project in lename the postmodern from the position of the postcolonial also finds lis niche in postsubaltern reason as a differential locus of enunciation.

#### The alternative is the method of the 3 tier process. Our usage of multiple forms of knowledge production within debate makes alternative forms of knowledge production legitimate and checks the homogenizing function of 'expert' discourse.

That is Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley in 2008

("THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE" pages 81-83) (ASIA)

**The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence; their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.” In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledge-making practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.” Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claimsin debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about *personal experience*, *organic intellectuals*, and *academic intellectuals*. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.” Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on *singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power*. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the double-octo-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.” The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that *exclude* *racial* and *ethnic minorities* from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions *prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia* from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more *meaningful* and *educational* view as far as how we achieve our education. The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks, Green argues that *without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.”* The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.**